RWANDA GENOCIDE -- THE REAL STORY
On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down by unknown assailants as his plane approached the Rwandan capital of Kigali. Habyarimana's death triggered a chain of events in which neighbor turned on neighbor and friend upon friend. Murders occurred within families as ethnic Hutu killed their ethnic Tutsi relatives. Many Hutu priests refused asylum to Tutsi fugitives, and some Hutu schoolteachers actually murdered their Tutsi students. Although the violence appeared spontaneous, it was in fact planned. Many reports in Western news media inaccurately described what was happening as a tribal conflict. The true causes lay elsewhere.
The conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi in east central Africa was not new. Nor was it the product of ancient tribal hatreds as was so often reported. The Hutu and Tutsi are not tribes. A tribe is a distinct community with its own language, customs, territory, and religion. Hutu and Tutsi in the nations of Rwanda and Burundi share the same territory, speak the same languages (Kinyarwanda in Rwanda, Kirundi in Burundi), share the same customs, practice the same religion, and frequently intermarry. The real difference between the majority Hutu (who make up between 80 and 85 percent of the population in Rwanda and Burundi) and the minority Tutsi (between 12 and 15 percent in both countries) is sociopolitical.
The aboriginal inhabitants of the area now known as Rwanda were the Twa. Rwanda's Hutu migrated to the region later and were well established by the time the Tutsi arrived in the 1400s. This early precolonial society was hierarchical, with Tutsi serving as the ruling aristocracy. Their status was linked to the ownership of cattle, a symbol of social distinction in many East African societies.
Hutus were not allowed to own cattle unless the cattle were given to them by a Tutsi overlord. The granting of cattle, a ceremonial process called ubuhake in Kinyarwanda, was an essential link between Tutsi social patrons and their Hutu clients. For example, Hutu soldiers who served their Tutsi masters well in war were often rewarded with cattle.
Wars in the region were frequent, but they did not pit Tutsi against Hutu. Rather, they were civil conflicts between high lineage Tutsis who were supported by their Hutu retainers in a system similar to that of medieval Europe. Or they were wars between the kingdom of Rwanda and the neighboring kingdoms of Iweju, Mpororo, Nkore, or Buha, which today are part of Uganda and Tanzania.
Rwanda was first colonized by Germany (from 1894 to 1916) and then by Belgium (from 1916 to 1962). Belgium occupied the region during World War I (1914-1918) and ruled under a mandate from the League of Nations and later the UN. Both Germany and Belgium chose to exercise their rule through Rwanda's existing social system of Tutsi aristocrats and Hutu clients. However, their reasons for doing so created tensions between these groups and helped lay the groundwork for Rwanda's later conflicts.
Using physical characteristics as a guide—the Tutsi were generally tall, thin, and more “European” in their appearance than the shorter, stockier Hutu—the colonizers decided that the Tutsi and the Hutu were two different races. According to the racial theories of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Tutsi, with their more “European” appearance, were deemed the “master race” and received preferential treatment. By 1930 Belgium's Rwandan auxiliaries were almost entirely Tutsi, a status that earned them the durable hatred of the Hutu.
After World War II (1939-1945) many African colonies began moving toward independence. Favored in everything, including education, Rwanda's Tutsi were more keenly aware of the trend toward independence and sought independence from Belgium. In a desperate bid to stave off this demand, the Belgians began supporting the Hutu against the Tutsi, touching off a violent struggle. The fighting began in 1959 and eventually led to independence under a Hutu-dominated government in 1962.
Although the number of people killed and exiled between 1959 and 1962 was tiny compared to 1994, the events of those years caused a great deal of damage to the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi. About 15,000 Tutsis were killed between 1959 and 1962 and about 120,000 fled Rwanda to escape persecution by the new Hutu-led government. Many fled to Burundi, where Tutsi dominated the new independent government, but also to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania. Some traveled as far as Europe and the United States.
In the name of social and historical justice, the new Hutu-dominated government in Rwanda enacted unabashedly anti-Tutsi policies in an effort to avenge years of Tutsi domination. Using ethnically based quotas, the government's “Hutu Power” ideology, a mix of ethnic and social theories whose common theme was Hutu superiority, limited what jobs and social positions could be held by Tutsis. Those Tutsi who stayed behind became second-class citizens, while those who fled abroad were not allowed to return.
The Hutu-led government restricted economic opportunities available to Tutsis. Most Rwandans sought to earn a living by farming, but land was scarce owing to Rwanda's small size, about 26,000 sq km (10,000 sq mi). This scarcity was made worse by a post-independence population growth of about 3 percent annually. Tutsis who attempted to purchase land were often blocked by government restrictions, and those whose land had been confiscated between 1959 and 1962 were unable to win it back. Tutsis also faced discrimination in other fields. Government jobs, for example, were reserved for Hutus. As a result, many Tutsis went into business for themselves or worked for international organizations.
Despite these abuses, the Rwandan government's resolutely pro-Western stance during the Cold War ensured that it retained solid foreign support. Many Western governments, especially those of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Switzerland, were involved in economic aid and political support for the Hutu-led government. Tutsi exiles abroad attempted to voice their concerns and complaints, but they were largely ignored.
The situation changed drastically with the outbreak of civil war in Uganda in 1981. Guerrilla leader (now president) Yoweri Museveni belonged to the Nyankole tribe from western Uganda. Museveni's social group within the Nyankole, the Himas, occupied the same social position as had the Tutsis prior to Rwandan independence. The government of former Ugandan president Milton Obote considered the Himas and the Tutsis to be natural allies and, emphasizing this association, depicted Museveni as a foreigner in an attempt to discredit him.
Caught in the midst of this propaganda and targeted as rebel allies, the Rwandan Tutsi refugees in western Uganda were soon engulfed in an antiguerrilla repression and joined Museveni's fighters in order to survive. As members of Museveni's army, the Tutsi refugees gained military experience and acquired weapons. When Museveni finally won the war and seized power in 1986, the Rwandan Tutsi refugees became part of the regular Ugandan army.
From their new position of power the Tutsi refugees began plotting their return to Rwanda. It was a country that many of them did not know, since most had fled Rwanda in their early childhood or had been born abroad. Over the next four years they created an underground organization called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and prepared to invade Rwanda. In October 1990 they attacked.
The war lasted until August 1993 when Habyarimana finally accepted a power-sharing agreement with the RPF in a treaty signed in Arusha, Tanzania. But Hutu extremists in his government did not accept the peace agreement. Some of these extremists, who were high-level government officials and military personnel, had begun devising their own solution to the “Tutsi problem” as early as 1992. Habyarimana's controversial decision to make peace with the RPF won others over to their side, including opposition leaders. Many of those involved in planning the 1994 genocide saw themselves as patriots, defending their country against outside aggression. Moderate Hutus who supported peace with the RPF also became their targets.
In April 1994 Habyarimana's plane was shot down as he was returning from an international conference in Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania. His death marked the start of the genocide.
The killings in Rwanda shattered the post-World War II illusion that the world would no longer stand idly by while genocide was openly occurring. Unlike the genocide of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia that took the lives of nearly two million people in the 1970s while Cambodia was rigidly closed to the outside world, the atrocities in Rwanda were recorded on nightly television reports. The 1948 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was shamelessly violated. Several countries, including the United States, carefully refrained from referring to what went on as a “genocide.” The 1948 convention would have obliged them to take action if they had.
The UN also failed to respond, unable to overcome the conflicting concerns of its members. The UN had a force of about 1500 peacekeepers in Rwanda at the time the massacres began, stationed there as part of the 1993 Arusha agreement. These troops did not attempt to halt the genocide because UN members were concerned about becoming enmeshed in the conflict. In fact on April 21, 1994, just as some of the most violent massacres were taking place, the UN Security Council voted to reduce the number of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda.
France was in the worst position of all. The French government had provided military support to the Hutu-led government throughout its war with the RPF. France believed that the Tutsi exiles—some of whom had learned English during their years in Uganda—were bent on destroying French influence in Rwanda with the support of the United Kingdom and the United States. This bizarre view had very little to do with reality. The majority of the exiles spoke little or no English, and they certainly did not take orders from the United Kingdom or the United States. Nevertheless, this belief led French officials to maintain contacts with the genocidal regime and tolerate the worst acts of violence perpetrated by their former clients.
Because of the chaotic nature of the genocide, the total number of people killed has never been systematically assessed, but most experts believe the total may be as many as 1,000,000 people. This includes about 900,000 Tutsis and approximately 50,000 politically moderate Hutus who did not support the genocide. Many of these killings were carried out by club- and machete-wielding mobs, and their victims often died horribly. Only about 130,000 Tutsis survived the massacres.
More than 100,000 people are awaiting trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for genocide-related crimes. The court sits in Arusha, Tanzania, but hundreds of local tribunals have been established in Rwanda to take evidence from witnesses and victims. It may be years before Rwanda's barely functioning judicial system manages to resolve these cases. As a result of confessions given by many Hutus, every month more mass graves are discovered.
In addition to the organized slaughter, there were also thousands of rapes and beatings, and untold psychological damage was done to those who witnessed but escaped the killings. Over 100,000 houses were torn down. Businesses were looted, and other property destroyed. Many of the country's most important citizens were killed or forced to flee, including its most experienced government workers, judges, lawyers, physicians, and many other professionals. These losses continue to haunt Rwanda today in the form of a poor economy, an overwhelmingly backlogged judicial system, and an inexperienced government.
The killings also triggered a new round of fighting between the government and the RPF, which sought to stop the slaughter by ousting the Hutu-led government. As the RPF advanced, its forces killed an estimated 50,000 Hutus considered responsible for the massacres. The Hutu-led government attempted to use these killings to convince the Hutu population that the RPF, which came to power in July 1994, was planning a counter-genocide and that all Hutus should flee the country.
The ousted Hutu government was partially successful. By August 1994 more than two million Hutus (about 30 percent of Rwanda's Hutu population) had fled to Tanzania and what was then Zaire (now renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Many of those responsible for planning and executing the genocide accompanied the refugees, hiding among the mass of innocents. Under the influence of these extremists, the UN-supported refugee camps became hotbeds of subversion and terrorism aimed at the new RPF-led government.
At first the RPF takeover appeared to improve political conditions in Rwanda. The new government was balanced between RPF representatives and Hutus who had opposed Habyarimana's ethnic dictatorship. The new government seemed poised to begin the arduous task of reconstruction and reconciliation. But the power-sharing arrangement did not last.
From bases in the teeming refugee camps of eastern Zaire, the ousted Hutu army was purchasing weapons with money taken from the national treasury and conducting cross-border raids. Despite Rwanda's calls for the camps to be shut down, international attention was focused more on caring for the refugees than sorting out the guilty from among their ranks. The few attempts that were made to shut down the camps met with resistance from the refugees, who had been told by the extremists that they would face retribution in Rwanda.
Meanwhile, as the UN-sponsored war crimes tribunal was struggling to get off the ground, many of the genocide's masterminds were openly living abroad. Exiled government officials denied that the genocide had even taken place, insisting instead that their victims had died in battle.
These circumstances led to a radicalization of the Rwandan government. The military began to demand an increased role in the political process, and RPF hardliners moved to consolidate their control over the government. Government reshuffles in August 1995 and March 1997 resulted in the removal from power or demotion of many Hutu politicians, especially those with independent political support. These politicians were replaced with Hutus who owed their prominence to the RPF. Even Tutsis tended to be chosen more on the basis of their support for the RPF than any other quality. As a result, the government grew increasingly authoritarian and militarized.
This trend was reinforced by the sudden crisis that developed in late 1996 in what was then Zaire. Most of the Hutu refugee camps in Zaire were located in the two eastern provinces of Sud-Kivu and Nord-Kivu, just across the border from Rwanda. The presence of so many anti-Tutsi elements in eastern Zaire intensified existing tensions between the Zairian government of Mobutu Sese Seko and Zaire's ethnic Tutsi population. In the fall of 1996, the Banyamulenge (a Kinyarwanda-speaking group of Zairian Tutsis) rebelled against Zaire's efforts to force them out of the country. Rwanda began providing military support to the rebels. While assisting the Banyamulenge, the Rwandans also moved to close down the refugee camps. Amid the chaos in Zaire, the Tanzanian government forced Hutu refugees who had fled to Tanzania in 1994 to return home.
By December 1996 several hundred thousand refugees had crossed back into Rwanda. The remainder, including many of those responsible for the genocide, fled into the Zairian jungle. They were driven westward by the advancing rebels, who by then were comprised of several movements in addition to the Banyamulenge and were known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL). Many of the refugees died during their trek across Zaire, and the UN has found evidence that some were killed by the AFDL. Under the command of veteran revolutionary Laurent Désiré Kabila, the AFDL overthrew Mobutu in May 1997.
With the majority of the refugees back within Rwanda's borders and the remainder on the run, the threat of cross-border raids had been eliminated. However, the new situation posed fresh challenges.
The Zairian crisis and the return of the refugees strengthened Rwanda's armed forces at the expense of its civilian government. The army's association with Kabila's victorious AFDL brought economic opportunities—including gold mining and logging—that have gained it a measure of financial independence from Rwanda's central government. Nevertheless, the military still consumes about half of Rwanda's annual budget. In addition, the army was given responsibility for maintaining internal security, a role that led to the de facto transfer of police authority from civilians to the military.
The returning Hutu were largely alienated and did not recognize the legitimacy of the new government. Some returnees found that their homes had been destroyed or occupied by Tutsis. Many were accused of participating in the genocide and arrested. These prisoners live in unsanitary, overcrowded conditions—in some cases with less than 1 sq m (about 1 sq yd) of floor space per detainee. Over the past three years about 5000 prisoners have died as a result of these conditions.
Rwanda's Tutsis also faced problems. RPF colonels of Ugandan origin have come to dominate the government, leading to tensions between the newly arrived Tutsis and those who survived the genocide. Economic troubles have surfaced. The one million Tutsis who had been slaughtered during the genocide were mostly peasants, but those who returned from exile were urbanized and uninterested in farming. Rwanda's urban economy is still recovering from the effects of the civil war and genocide, and although no precise figures for unemployment in Rwanda are available, many of these former exiles—and many Hutus as well—are either underemployed or unemployed.
Rwanda's economy remains badly damaged, with little hope of a quick recovery. There are several reasons for this, including the lack of roads, bridges, and telephone lines. Education is also suffering due to a shortage of schools, educational materials, and teachers, many of whom died in the genocide. Foreign countries and international agencies have pledged funds to aid Rwanda's recovery, but much of this aid has failed to materialize. Much of the aid money that is distributed disappears into the pockets of corrupt officials.
The country remains split along an ethnic divide, with most of the Tutsis living in towns and most of the Hutus dependent on subsistence agriculture. Because they distrust the Tutsi-led government, many Hutus are reluctant to support government economic plans. Demand for land is great, but as a result of widespread deforestation—due to the need for fuel and new land—precious topsoil is being lost to erosion.
A visitor to Rwanda today observes relative calm and, on the surface, life seems to be back to normal. The Anglican Church of Rwanda is vibrant and growing (nearly 200 American churches split off from the crumbling Episcopal Church have joined the Anglican Mission in America, headed by Archbishop Kolini of the Rwanda church). The economy is mending and socio-political strife is at a low point. However, all is not what it seems.
Most of the population of Rwanda remains traumatized by the horrific events of 1994, and a generation of child survivors has lost faith and trust in their fellow man. Spend more than ten minutes in conversation and you will find gaping wounds in the heart of most Rwandans. Hope for their future lies not with the modicum of justice brought about by the International Tribunal, but in the ability of the church to bring an effective message of reconciliation and healing.